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The final crucial stage of the 2012 reform of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) is nearing its conclusion. After a promising start with the publication of a bold and insightful Green Paper in 2009, the commitment to fundamental reform has lost its momentum. Unless the hitherto untried co-decision making process involving the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament can weave some magic, the final outcome is likely to be disappointing and largely ineffective.

Throughout its 30 year history the CFP has proved a stubborn animal to manage and even more difficult to reform. It is quite unlike any other EU policy. For reasons now lost in the mists of time, EU institutions are given exclusive competence over matters relating to the conservation of stocks. Until this year policy decisions have been taken solely by Council and detailed technical measures handed down as regulations rather than as directives that allow Member States (MS) more discretion over the form of implementation.

The CFP is also subject to decennial review which should in theory permit adaptive management, responding to changes in the state of the stocks, the health of marine ecosystems or the conditions of global markets. In practice, however, previous reforms (1992, 2002) have been characterised by a lack of ambition for fundamental change, inevitable compromises over more contentious issues and weak outcomes. As a result, the policy has undergone incremental path-dependent change that has compounded its problems rather than cured them.

A radical agenda for change

2012 was going to be different. The Commission's Green Paper set out a radical agenda for reform based not on changes to the regulatory framework per se but a bold restructuring of the roles of EU institutions, regions, MS and stakeholders in the formulation and implementation of Community policy. At the centre of the reforms was a change to the governance system that would place more responsibility for management of the fisheries in the hands of the MS and their fishing industries.

Three key elements were involved. Regionalisation of the CFP would allow the adaptation of EU policy to suit the particular conditions of the region and the region's MS, working together, would develop long term management plans intended to fulfil the principles, objectives, time frames and targets laid down by the EU institutions. Based on sea basins and building on the success of the five Regional Advisory Councils introduced following the 2002 reforms, it would provide the framework for a genuine ecosystem based approach to managing the EU's fisheries. This would allow better use of technical conservation measures (gear selectivity; use of permanent , seasonal and real time ground closures), the creation of innovative measures to incentivise sustainable fishing, and a reduced emphasis on output controls (ie quota).

Meanwhile the more controversial adoption of rights based management, using transferable fishing concessions (TFCs), across the EU 'common pond' was intended to assist rationalisation of the fishing fleets, improve efficiency and increase profitability.  But it would also give vessel owners a greater financial interest in the state of stocks and more control over the development of their businesses. 

Finally, as a means of incentivising fishermen to take more responsibility for their actions, industry organisations such as producer organisations (POs) would be encouraged to draw up their own annual fishing plans. These would set out how the industry intended to fulfil the objectives, norms and targets set out in the region's long term management plans. While regionalisation would provide the strategic direction for fisheries management, the region's fishermen would assume greater individual and collective responsibility for the conduct of the fisheries.

What went wrong?

Things have not worked out as the Commission intended. Regionalising the CFP as a policy transforming process was effectively ruled out by the Commission's own legal advisers on grounds that it would challenge the EU's exclusive competence in respect of conservation policy and contravene the European Treaties that recognise only the EU institutions and MS as legal partners in the decision making process. Although the Commission remains supportive of regionalisation, its proposals for a new basic regulation governing the conduct of the CFP after 2012 made only the merest of concessions concerning the delegation of powers to MS and made no mention of collaboration at the regional level. In effect, therefore, the vital source of energy for driving through changes to the governance system appears to have been cut off.

Perhaps not surprisingly the notion of a Europe wide system of TFCs was ruled out early in the consultation process following its hostile reception by a majority of MS fearing a loss of fishing opportunities through cross border trade in fishing rights and the consequent threat to the stability of their fishing industries. There is little enthusiasm across Europe for what many regard as the privatisation of common property resources, with uncertain but very likely negative consequences for the small scale fisheries that help to underpin the sustainability of coastal communities. At present only a handful of MS have adopted rights based management and even the more modest proposals for national systems based on TFCs appear to be in difficulty.

Only the stakeholder led annual fishing plans have survived, though in somewhat altered form. These are scheduled for implementation under the revised Common Organisation of the Market as 'integrated production and marketing plans' drawn up by individual producer organisations. Whether they will prove as detailed and robust as many in the industry had been hoping for remains to be seen. But without the strategic orientation of long term management planning at the regional level it is difficult to see precisely how the fishing plans will contribute to the sustainable development of the region's fisheries.

As things stand, therefore, it would seem that the engine room of the 2012 reforms that would have transformed the governance system and reinvigorated the CFP has been badly damaged.

What needs to be done?

It is still not too late to repair some of the damage through the ongoing co-decision process. Both the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament have signalled their intention of adding substance to the emasculated framework of regionalisation presented in the Commission's proposals for the new basic regulation. Their efforts will need to ensure that the door to improved governance and meaningful regionalisation is not firmly shut as a result of too restrictive a wording of the relevant chapter of the new regulation.

The key elements of effective regionalisation are threefold. First, an opportunity must be provided for MS to work together informally and with the help of the region's Advisory Council to develop a long term ecosystem based strategy for managing the region's fisheries in line with marine environmental policy, covering all sectors and activities at the scale of the regional ecosystems. Secondly, a robust system must be created for coordinating scientific and stakeholder advice and agreeing specific actions to be undertaken by MS to improve fisheries management within their regional sea. Thirdly, strong links must be forged between the regional strategy, long term management plans and industry led annual fishing plans to ensure coherent management. Not all of these elements will require specific provision in the new basic regulation. However, MS will need to be actively encouraged to pursue all four actions if fisheries and marine management and its outcomes are to be significantly improved.

The missing element – the introduction across Europe of rights based management based on TFCs – is not essential to regionalising the CFP. Such is the hostility to its mandatory imposition that it would probably be wiser to allow each MS to determine the quota management system most appropriate to its own circumstances. This would, however, mean the Commission having to find an alternative means of addressing the problems of excess fishing capacity that the quota market might otherwise be expected to solve.

If co-decision fails to restore credibility to the ideas of a much stronger regional  perspective and local stakeholder input into the way fisheries are managed, the 2012 reforms are likely to be remembered as another missed opportunity. It will raise questions as to whether the CFP can ever be fundamentally reformed. Moreover, it will invite criticism that policy reform is governed more by a will to preserve the status quo in terms of EU institutions than by the need to ensure sustainability for the EU's important fishery resources and viability for Europe's fishing industries and coastal communities.

